Seat biases of apportionment methods under general distributional assumptions  by Schwingenschlögl, U.
Applied Mathematics Letters 21 (2008) 1–3
www.elsevier.com/locate/aml
Seat biases of apportionment methods under general
distributional assumptions
U. Schwingenschlo¨gl
Institut fu¨r Physik, Universita¨t Augsburg, 86135 Augsburg, Germany
Received 1 August 2006; received in revised form 22 December 2006; accepted 6 February 2007
Abstract
Apportionment methods round vote proportions to integer numbers of seats in parliament. Seat biases of an apportionment
method are expected differences between the seats actually apportioned to the parties and their ideal fractional shares of seats. In
this letter it is shown that, for many popular apportionment methods, asymptotic seat biases for an increasing number of seats in
parliament do not depend on the distributional assumption for the vote counts.
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1. Introduction
In proportional representation systems, electoral vote proportions have to be mapped to seat allocations, using
apportionment methods. On the basis of early ideas of Po´lya [1–4], seat biases induced by this adjustment process
can be addressed by a geometric–combinatorial approach. In the following, the vector w = (w1, . . . , w`)t of vote
proportions in favour of the ` competing parties is considered to be a random vector in the probability simplex
S` := {w ∈ [0, 1]` : ∑`i=1 wi = 1}. Assuming that the parties are ordered according to their vote counts, the
seat bias is defined as the conditional expectation of the difference between the numbers of seats actually allocated to
the parties A(w) and their ideal shares of seats wM ,
B`(M) := E[A(w)− wM | w1 ≥ · · · ≥ w`], (1)
where M is the number of seats in parliament. Previous work has focused on uniformly distributed vote proportions [5–
10]. For an alternative model see [11]. The vector m = (m1, . . . ,m`)t of seat allocations, representing the number
of seats assigned to each party, has integer non-negative components summing to M . A survey on apportionment
methods is given in [12,13].
In this letter the asymptotic behaviour of seat biases is analyzed for a growing number of seats in parliament under
general assumptions for the distribution of the electoral vote proportions, which usually is not known in detail.
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2. Results and discussion
Theorem 1. Let the distribution of the vote proportions w have a Riemann integrable Lebesgue density f (w) on the
probability simplex S`. Then the asymptotic seat bias for a q-stationary divisor method is
lim
M→∞B
`(M) = lim
M→∞E[A(w)− wM |w1 ≥ · · · ≥ w`]
=
(
1
2
− q
)
(1− ` · E[w|w1 ≥ · · · ≥ w`]). (2)
If f (w) ∈ C2(S`) then the asymptotic seat bias for the method of Hamilton/Hare is
lim
M→∞B
`(M) = 0. (3)
Proof. Eq. (2) is established in [14, Corollary 3.2], see also [15].
In order to prove Eq. (3), we expand f (w) ∈ C2(S`≥) according to f (x0 + h) = f (x0) + h · f ′(x0) +O(h2), for
all x0 ∈ S`≥ := {w ∈ S` : w1 ≥ . . . ≥ w`}. Then we proceed analogously to the geometric–combinatorial approach
in [7]. In particular, we apply the decomposition of S` into rounding polytopes P(m) := cl{w ∈ S` : A(w) = m},
where cl denotes set closure. Detailed knowledge about the vertices of these rounding polytopes entails [5]
f (w) = f (M−1m)+ M−1 f ′(M−1m)+O(M−2), (4)
for all w ∈ P(m). By [6, Theorem 2], we therefore can write
lim
M→∞B
`(M) = lim
M→∞
[(∑`
r=1
`!p(r)
(`− r)! S˜
r
(M)
)
− E f [wM |w1 ≥ · · · ≥ w`]
]
(5)
with polynomials
S˜
r
(M) :=
∑
m∈Kr (M)
vol(S`≥)
br (m)
( f (M−1m)+ M−1 f ′(M−1m))m (6)
not depending on the apportionment method used. Here Kr (M), r ≤ `, is the set of seat allocations with r non-
vanishing components, and br (m) denotes the number of permutations of these components leaving m invariant.
Moreover, p(r) is the distribution of the seat allocation vector A(w) in the case of a uniform distribution on S`≥, which
turns out to depend only on the number of parties actually obtaining at least one seat [6, Theorems 1 and 4]. Because
the two leading order terms of p(`) and p(`− 1) in an expansion in the house size M are identical for the stationary
divisor method with standard rounding (q = 1/2) and the method of Hamilton/Hare [7, Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2]
the proof is complete, and (3) results from (2) by setting q = 0.5. 
Theorem 1 states that the apportionment methods of Webster/Sainte-Lague¨ (q = 1/2) and Hamilton/Hare are
asymptotically unbiased for M → ∞ under very mild assumptions on the distribution of the vote proportions. For
q-stationary divisor methods with parameter q 6= 0.5 finite seat biases arise, which, due to (5), are given by the
barycenter of the weight function f (w) on S`≥.
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